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CRIMINAL LAW
THE PROPER REMEDY FOR A LACK OF
BATSON FINDINGS:
THE FALL-OUT FROM SNYDER V.
LOUISIANA
WILLIAM H. BURGESS * & DOUGLAS G. SMITH **
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Batson v. Kentucky is familiar to most law students and to many fans
of Law & Order. The Supreme Court held in Batson that the Equal
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to
exclude potential jurors from a jury on the basis of race. Racial
discrimination in jury selection harms the defendant, violates the rights of
the excluded juror, and harms the public by undermining confidence in the
criminal justice system. 2 If a criminal defendant (or the defendant’s
attorney) believes that a prosecutor has attempted to use a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of race, the defendant
may make a “Batson challenge.” The Supreme Court’s opinion in Batson
sets forth a procedure that the trial court must follow in resolving such
challenges: if the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the
prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was motivated by race, then the
prosecutor must offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror and
*
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476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2
Id. at 87; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
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the trial court must then decide whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination.3
The Batson procedure is an attempt to reconcile the tension between
the constitutional guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause and the
centuries-old practice of permitting prosecutors and defense attorneys to
exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection. More than twenty
years of experience with that procedure has demonstrated the importance of
the trial court’s observations during jury selection and contemporaneous
findings of fact regarding the credibility of the race-neutral explanation that
a prosecutor offers when challenged on the use of a peremptory challenge.
Although the trial court’s resolution of a Batson challenge is subject to
appellate review, appellate courts rely heavily upon the trial court’s findings
and observations. Whether a Batson challenge should be sustained
ultimately turns on whether the prosecutor is credible when he or she
asserts a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. In some
instances, the race-neutral explanation can be confirmed or rejected on the
basis of the record—for example, when a transcript confirms that a juror
said something inconsistent with the juror’s duty to weigh the evidence
impartially, or where a questionnaire confirms that a juror’s background
may inject bias. But a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation often turns on
a juror’s demeanor observed during jury selection, which is not something
that an appellate court can discern from a cold record. Moreover,
peremptory strikes are often the product of instincts of which the prosecutor
is not fully aware. Accordingly, courts hold that demeanor-based
explanations, in particular, should be scrutinized carefully, as they are often
a convenient way to hide racial prejudice. Where a prosecutor gives a
demeanor-based, race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge and
the trial court allows the challenge without observing the demeanor of the
challenged juror and without commenting on how it determined that the
prosecutor was credible, appellate review of the trial court’s ruling is
practically impossible.
In recent years, state and federal appellate courts have struggled with
the question of what should happen when (1) the trial court denies a
defendant’s Batson challenge without making the necessary factual findings
to permit appellate review and (2) the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation
for the challenged strike cannot be confirmed or rejected on the basis of the
record. 4 The question arises frequently in criminal cases, and one of the
Supreme Court’s most recent decisions addressing Batson challenges—
3
4

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98; see also infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
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Snyder v. Louisiana 5—has added to the confusion. In Snyder, the Supreme
Court granted review some twelve years after jury selection and ordered a
new trial where the trial court had failed in its duty to make factual findings
assessing the credibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for
questionable peremptory strikes. As the prosecutor’s explanation was
based on the juror’s demeanor, it could not be confirmed or rejected on the
basis of the record.
Despite the fact that the Court in Snyder ordered a new trial, the lower
courts are divided on whether a new trial is always required in similar
situations, or whether it is instead permissible to remand to the trial court
for retroactive findings or to conduct an evidentiary hearing to reconstruct
the prosecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection.6 Decisions
permitting such remands have invited post hoc justifications for
questionable peremptory strikes and have sown further confusion as
litigants dispute the permissible parameters of such proceedings (such as
whether and to what extent discovery should be permitted, whether defense
attorneys may question the prosecutor under oath, and whether the
prosecutor may give new reasons on remand that were not given at trial).7
Such remands have occasionally taken on lives of their own and wasted
judicial resources. 8 Lower courts will continue to struggle with the
question until the Supreme Court provides a definitive answer.
This Article argues that both doctrinal and practical considerations
counsel in favor of granting the criminal defendant a new trial when the
trial court fails to make sufficient findings of fact and where the
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for the challenged strike cannot be
confirmed or rejected on the basis of the existing record.
Part II explains the doctrinal underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Batson, and the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Snyder v. Louisiana. In Batson, the Court articulated a three-part test to
determine whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 9 In Snyder, the Court applied that test in the
context of a peremptory challenge exercised on the basis of juror demeanor,

5

552 U.S. 472 (2008).
Compare McGahee v. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2009)
(ordering a new trial), with United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 670 (7th Cir. 2009)
(remanding for further findings), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 373; see also infra Part III.A–B.
7
See infra Part IV.B–C.
8
See infra Part IV.D.
9
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986); see also infra Part II.C.
6
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underscoring that trial courts have a duty to make explicit, on-the-record
findings in rejecting a Batson challenge. 10
Part III discusses the different approaches that state and federal
appellate courts have taken when the trial court has failed to make the
findings required by Batson and where the prosecutor’s race-neutral
explanation cannot be confirmed or denied on the basis of the record. Some
courts have held that Snyder requires a new trial in all such cases. 11 Other
courts have ordered a remand, directing the trial court to supply the missing
findings retroactively if it can, and sometimes permitting the trial court to
hold an evidentiary hearing for that purpose. 12 At least one federal court
has held, however, that even after Snyder, a lack of explicit findings in
resolving a Batson challenge is not necessarily reversible error. 13
Part IV offers an analysis of the doctrinal and practical considerations
bearing on the question, concluding that those considerations counsel in
favor of a bright-line rule directing appellate courts to order a new trial
whenever a trial court resolves a Batson challenge without making the
required findings and where the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation
cannot be confirmed or rejected on the basis of the existing record. Several
considerations counsel in favor of such a bright-line rule. For example,
such a rule eliminates the possibility that a remand may morph into a series
of endless proceedings with additional appeals and subsequent remand. It
also avoids the temptation to engage in post hoc rationalization of the trial
court’s prior ruling and avoids the problem that occurs when the lapse of
time since the trial court’s initial ruling renders subsequent findings
unreliable. Finally, it avoids placing on trial judges what is often an
insurmountable burden—to attempt to reconstruct what happened
sometimes months or years earlier, often based solely on the judge’s
recollection. In light of these inherent problems, a new trial is in many, if
not most, cases the best solution.
II. BATSON CHALLENGES AND THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SNYDER
V. LOUISIANA
The Supreme Court’s decision in Batson addresses the conflict
between the longstanding practice of allowing prosecutors to use
peremptory challenges during jury selection and the constitutional
prohibition against excluding people from juries on the basis of race. The
10
11
12
13

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also infra Part III.C.
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Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that
peremptory challenges be subject to scrutiny whenever a criminal defendant
can make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in the
exercise of the challenge. 14 While this might seem like a commonsense
application of the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in light of the
fundamental nature of the right to serve on a jury, in practice it has been
somewhat problematic, largely because of the difficulty of discerning with
any confidence whether a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge is
motivated by race. 15 Litigants have repeatedly called upon the Supreme
Court to clarify how the Batson procedure is to be applied in practice.16
A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Although there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, or
requirement that they be allowed for either the prosecution or the defense,17
peremptory challenges have been part of jury trials in the United States and
England for centuries and have been traditionally viewed as a valuable tool
in the selection of an impartial jury. 18 Among other things, peremptory
challenges allow defendants and prosecutors to remove jurors they
intuitively suspect of bias where the evidence of bias is not sufficient to
support a challenge for cause. Peremptory challenges also allow attorneys

14

Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–96.
See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(describing the “awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s
instinctive judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even to the prosecutor
exercising the challenge”); Munson v. State, 774 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(citing Batson and a state court case applying it as giving the defendant the “practical burden
to make a liar out of the prosecutor”); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 162–63 (2010)
(disussing—and criticizing—the reluctance of trial judges to reject prosecutors’ race-neutral
explanations).
16
See infra Parts II.C–D; infra notes 69–82, 145 and accompanying text.
17
Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009); United States v. Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
18
Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)); 6
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(d), at 121–22 (3d ed. 2007); see
also Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis
and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 510–16 (1997) (comparing the American
system of voir dire and peremptory challenges with practice in civil law countries and
discussing the strategic and sometimes abusive use of peremptory challenges); Douglas G.
Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377,
400–02, 434–36, 470–72 (1996) (explaining the history and practice of peremptory
challenges in England and the United States).
15
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to remove jurors they have inadvertently alienated through voir dire
questioning. 19
The use of peremptory challenges has been traced back at least as far
as the early fourteenth century in England,20 and one of the statutes passed
by the First Congress in the United States explicitly provided for the use of
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants charged with crimes against
the United States. 21 Every jurisdiction in the United States currently grants
A
peremptory challenges to the defense and the prosecution.22
characteristic feature of peremptory challenges as historically exercised is
that, unlike a challenge for cause, the party exercising a peremptory
challenge generally need not explain its reasons to the court or to anyone
else. As Blackstone observed, traditionally the peremptory challenge was
“an arbitrary and capricious” procedure. 23
B. STRAUDER, SWAIN, AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The unrestricted nature of peremptory challenges changed in 1965 in
Swain v. Alabama, 24 where the Supreme Court subjected the practice to the
strictures of the Constitution. In a long line of cases beginning in 1880 with
Strauder v. West Virginia, 25 the Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government
19

See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (“[P]erhaps the bare
questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment: to prevent all ill
consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set
him aside.”).
20
JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 147–48 (1977) (citing The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat.
4 (1305)); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–13 (same); 6 LAFAVE, supra note 18, at §
22.3(d), at 122 (same). Although the 1305 statute, by its terms, took away the prosecution’s
right to exercise peremptory challenges, the practice under the statute was such that the
prosecution could still remove potential jurors without explanation, so long as there were a
sufficient number of jurors remaining at the end of jury selection. The procedure was
referred to as “standing aside” because the prosecutor could direct a juror to “stand aside”
until the end of jury selection. The prosecutor would only have to explain an objection to
those jurors if there were not enough jurors remaining. VAN DYKE, supra, at 148; see also
United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. 480, 483 (1827) (Story, J.).
21
An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States § 30, 1 Stat.
112, 119 (1790).
22
6 LAFAVE, supra note 18, at § 22.3(d), at 123.
23
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *353 (“[I]n criminal trials, or at least in capital ones,
there is, in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of
challenge to a certain number of jurors, without shewing any cause at all, which is called a
peremptory challenge.”).
24
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
25
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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from purposefully excluding people from juries on account of race. 26 In
Strauder, the Supreme Court invalidated a West Virginia statute that
forbade African Americans from serving on juries and reversed the
conviction of an African-American man who was found guilty of murder by
an all-white jury constituted under that statute.27 Between 1880 and 1965,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Strauder repeatedly and invalidated several
other state statutes that excluded African Americans from jury service.28
In Swain, the Supreme Court held that the principle of Strauder—that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids excluding people from jury service on
the basis of race—applied to peremptory challenges, but in a very limited
sense. 29 The Court imposed a high burden of proof, however, on criminal
defendants seeking to show a constitutional violation. The Court held that
the presumption must be that the prosecutor has used peremptory
challenges properly, and that the presumption is not overcome merely by
showing that the prosecutor has removed all of the potential jurors of a
certain race from the jury pool. 30 Instead, a defendant must show a
“systematic use” of purposefully race-based peremptory challenges “over a
period of time.” 31 The Court reasoned that a low burden of proof would
defeat the purpose and operation of peremptory challenges. If the
prosecutor’s motives for peremptory challenges could be examined in every
case in which the defense alleged racial discrimination, without the need to
show systematic discrimination over time, “[t]he challenge, pro tanto,
would no longer be peremptory.” 32 The defendant did not meet its burden
in Swain, the Court held, even though the prosecution had used six
peremptory challenges to remove all of the African-American jurors from
the jury, 33 and the defense had introduced uncontradicted testimony that no
African-American person had served on a jury in that county since 1950. 34
Three Justices dissented, accusing the majority of undermining the principle
26

See Swain, 380 U.S. at 204 n.1 (collecting cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84
n.3 (1986) (same).
27
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312.
28
Swain, 380 U.S. at 228–29 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing eighteen cases applying
Strauder).
29
Id. at 203–05.
30
Id. at 226–27.
31
Id. at 227.
32
Id. at 222.
33
There were eight African-American jurors in the pool. Two were excused, and the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove the remaining six. Id. at 205; VAN DYKE,
supra note 20, at 151.
34
Swain, 380 U.S. at 226 (“The fact remains, of course, that there has not been a Negro
on a jury in Talladega County since about 1950.”); see also VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 57.
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of Strauder, 35 and Swain was subjected to withering criticism in the ensuing
years as setting an impossibly high burden of proof. 36
C. BATSON V. KENTUCKY AND THE MODERN PROCEDURE FOR
OBJECTING TO THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

In 1986, the Batson Court overruled Swain’s burden of proof for
showing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in jury selection.37 The
Court held that a defendant need not show “systematic” use over time of
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, but could instead rely
“solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant’s trial.” 38 So long as a defendant was “a
member of a cognizable racial group” and the prosecutor has used
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors “of the defendant’s
race” from the jury pool, a defendant could rely solely on circumstantial
evidence from his own trial to make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination. 39 Drawing on prior cases applying the Equal Protection
Clause in jury selection and in other contexts, Batson established a threestep procedure to adjudicate a defendant’s claim that a prosecutor used a
peremptory challenge on the basis of race, which courts repeatedly applied
and refined in the ensuing years. 40 The Supreme Court recently described
the procedure as follows:
First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has
been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the

35

Swain, 380 U.S. at 228–47 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J, and Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court today while referring with approval to Strauder and the cases
which have followed, seriously impairs their authority and creates additional barriers to the
elimination of jury discrimination practices which have operated in many communities to
nullify the command of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
36
See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120–22 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing the
Swain burden of proof in a section titled “Mission Impossible” and documenting several
cases in which there was strong evidence of racial discrimination in the prosecution’s use of
peremptory challenges, but where defendants failed to meet the Swain burden of proof);
Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 n.17 (11th Cir. 1983) (collecting academic commentary
critical of Swain). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 n.14 (1986) (noting that
some commentators had urged the Supreme Court to adhere to Swain and citing as an
example of such commentary Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory
Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV.
337 (1982)).
37
Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93; see also id. at 100 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court
overturns the principal holding in Swain v. Alabama.”).
38
Id. at 94, 96.
39
Id. at 96.
40
Id. at 93–98.
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prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third,
in light of parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant
41
has shown purposeful discrimination.

Accordingly, once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation
for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, the trial court has “‘the duty to
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’” 42 In
doing so, the court must conduct an “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of
mind based on demeanor and credibility.”43
“[T]he trial court’s first-hand observations [are] of even greater
importance” where “race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges . . .
invoke a juror’s demeanor.” 44 There, “the trial court must evaluate not only
whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also
whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the
basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.” 45 Accordingly,
an “explicit, on-the-record analysis” is required. 46
Under Batson, the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation for the
challenge must be “clear and reasonably specific” and contain “legitimate
reasons.” 47 While “[a]n impression of the conduct and demeanor of a
prospective juror during the voir dire may provide a legitimate basis for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge,” the “prosecutor’s explanations in the
face of a Batson inquiry” must be “sufficiently specific to provide a basis
upon which to evaluate their legitimacy.” 48 “[B]ecause such after-the-fact
rationalizations are susceptible to abuse, a prosecutor’s reason for discharge
bottomed on demeanor evidence deserves particularly careful scrutiny.” 49
The Batson procedure is “designed to produce actual answers to
suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury
41

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77 (2008) (citations and alterations omitted).
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
43
Id. at 365.
44
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477.
45
Id.
46
McCurdy v. Montgomery Cnty., 240 F.3d 512, 521–22 (6th Cir. 2001). The court
explained that “an explicit, on-the-record analysis . . . is especially important when the
purported race-neutral justification is predicated on subjective explanations like body
language or demeanor”; the district court ruling in which it “perfunctorily accepted the
County’s race-neutral explanation” did not comply with the “requirement that the district
court make expressed findings on each of the elements of a Batson claim” and was only
corrected when “the district court made its own findings pertaining to [juror’s] demeanor.”
Id.
47
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 258 (1981)).
48
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1992).
49
Id.
42
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selection process,” 50 and seeks to accommodate the inherent tension arising
out of the coexistence of peremptory challenges and the constitutional
guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause.51 When the Supreme Court
decided Batson, Justice Marshall feared that it did not go far enough and
would have abolished peremptory strikes altogether. He noted the
difficulties of assessing the motives of prosecutors, particularly where a
strike may be the product of unconscious bias, and particularly where
demeanor-based explanations for peremptory strikes could easily be used to
hide racial bias. 52 The Batson majority defended its procedure, in part, by
asserting its faith in the diligence and alertness of trial judges during jury
selection: “Certainly, this Court may assume that trial judges, in supervising
voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination.” 53
D. SNYDER V. LOUISIANA

50

Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005).
In Batson, Justice Marshall stated that the tension between peremptory challenges and
the Equal Protection Clause is unresolvable, and called for the abolition of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–07 (Marshall, J., concurring); cf. Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer has echoed
Justice Marshall’s concerns, arguing that subsequent experience has underscored the conflict
between peremptory challenges and the Equal Protection Clause. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266–73 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring). However, Justice Breyer has stopped short of an explicit call for the
abolition of peremptory challenges, noting that “legal life without peremptories is no longer
unthinkable,” Rice, 546 U.S. at 344 (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 272
(same) (Breyer, J., concurring), and calling for the Court to “reconsider Batson’s test and the
peremptory challenge system as a whole.” Rice, 546 U.S. at 344 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 273 (same) (Breyer, J., concurring). Judge Bennett of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa reads Justice Breyer’s concurring opinions as a call
for the abolition of peremptory challenges, and calls for the same result. Bennett, supra note
15, at 167.
52
Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–06 (Marshall, J., concurring). In the years following Batson,
its holding has been extended to other forms of discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (2000) (holding that a criminal
defendant’s use of race-based peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause);
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (holding that prosecutor’s use of genderbased peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (permitting a private party in a civil case to use
peremptory challenges on the basis of race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
though framed as “the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (finding that Batson’s holding applies
regardless of whether defendant and excluded juror are of the same race).
53
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.22 (majority opinion).
51
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In Snyder v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court issued significant guidance
regarding the Batson procedure. In Snyder, an African-American man was
convicted of murder after a jury trial. Although jury selection occurred in
1996, 54 the case did not reach the Supreme Court until 2007. 55 The Court
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial where the trial court failed
to make adequate findings in the course of rejecting a Batson challenge. 56
In so ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Batson procedure
relies heavily on the firsthand observations of the trial court judge.
The facts and circumstances in Snyder were particularly compelling.
The prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse an AfricanAmerican prospective juror and offered two race-neutral explanations when
challenged, one of which was that the prospective juror “looked very
nervous.” 57 Defense counsel disputed those explanations, but the trial court
allowed the peremptory challenge without comment. 58 Accordingly, there
was no basis in the record to determine precisely why the trial court rejected
the Batson challenge.
The Court reaffirmed that “the Constitution forbids striking even a
single juror for a discriminatory purpose,” 59 and proceeded to examine the
record regarding the prosecutor’s explanations. The Court found that the
prosecution’s first explanation—that the prospective juror had a work
obligation that would conflict with jury service—could be evaluated on the
basis of the record, which showed that the explanation was “suspicious”
and “implausib[le].” 60 Regarding the explanation that the juror looked
nervous, the Court noted that there was no record of the prospective juror’s
demeanor, and “nervousness cannot be shown from a cold transcript.” 61 In
the absence of express findings regarding the nervousness explanation, the
Court could not “presume that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s
assertion that [the juror] was nervous.” 62
The ultimate resolution in Snyder is the main source of confusion in
the lower courts—in Snyder, the Court vacated the defendant’s conviction
54

552 U.S. at 475.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 473 (2007), available at
2007 WL 1812490.
56
Synder, 552 U.S. at 485–86.
57
Id. at 478.
58
Id. at 479.
59
Id. at 478.
60
Id. at 483. The record reflected that service as a juror would not substantially interfere
with the prospective juror’s work obligations and that the prosecutor “accept[ed] white jurors
who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear[ed] to have been at least as serious.” Id.
61
Id. at 479 (quoting Louisiana Supreme Court).
62
Id.
55
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and remanded for a new trial. In Batson, after announcing its new
procedure, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court did not require the
prosecutor to explain his peremptory challenge, and the Court thus
remanded for further proceedings. 63 The Court’s order did not vacate the
conviction, but instead instructed the lower courts to revisit the peremptory
challenge: “[i]f the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie,
purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s
conviction be reversed.” 64 In Snyder, however, the Court rejected the
possibility of remanding for further findings, noting that the record did not
show “that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged [the juror]
based on his nervousness alone. Nor [was] there any realistic possibility
that this subtle question of causation could be profitably explored further on
remand at this late date, more than a decade after petitioners’ trial.”65
Accordingly, the Court set aside the defendant’s conviction and sentence,
and remanded for “further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”66
The Louisiana Supreme Court understood the Court’s instructions to require
a new trial. 67
The Court was not explicit in Snyder about whether and to what extent
its decision to order a new trial instead of a remand rested on (1) the lapse
of more than ten years between jury selection in the trial court and the
Court’s decision—as opposed to the two years that had passed in Batson—
or (2) the trial court’s failure to make any factual findings in disposing of
the defendant’s Batson objection. It is perhaps for that reason that Snyder
has helped to deepen and crystallize a preexisting split of authority in the
lower courts, as different courts have drawn different lessons from Snyder
and reached different conclusions regarding the remedy required for a trial
court’s failure to make the findings required by Batson. Depending on how
one reads Snyder, there are four apparent possible consequences of a trial
court’s failure to make the required findings in cases where the appellate
court cannot confirm or reject the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation on
the basis of the record: (1) Snyder requires a new trial in all such cases, (2)
Snyder requires a new trial only in cases of extreme delay between the
63

Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
Id.
65
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485–86.
66
Id. at 486.
67
State v. Snyder, 982 So. 2d 763 (La. 2008) (characterizing the Court’s holding as
“effectively set[ting] aside defendant’s conviction and sentence”); see also Paul Purpura,
Kenner Man Indicted Again in 1995 Killing: Supreme Court Tossed Earlier Conviction,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 30, 2009, at B3 (noting the pendency of the new trial).
64
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initial jury selection and the remand, (3) Snyder permits appellate courts to
order remands for further findings, or (4) Snyder permits appellate courts to
presume that the trial court’s ruling was correct.
III. THE CONFLICT AMONG THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder has generated a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the proper relief in a case where the trial court failed
to make the required Batson findings. Some courts have read Snyder as
requiring a new trial in all such cases. Other courts have continued to order
a remand to the trial court to make the required findings, in some instances
ordering that the court undertake an evidentiary hearing. Finally, at least
one court—the Eighth Circuit—has held that the failure to make Batson
findings is not necessarily error at all. 68
A. COURTS ORDERING NEW TRIALS

Where a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for a strike cannot be
confirmed or rejected on the basis of the trial record, and where the trial
court failed to make the required findings in the course of resolving a
Batson objection to a peremptory strike, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
have ordered new trials, as have several state appellate courts and federal
district courts ruling on habeas petitions. Those courts have done so in
large measure in reliance upon Snyder, reading the Court’s decision
granting a new trial as imposing a broad and general command regarding
the proper relief when there is an absence of Batson findings.
In Haynes v. Quarterman, 69 the Fifth Circuit ordered a new trial. At
the defendant’s original trial, two different judges presided over different
parts of jury selection. One judge presided at the beginning when the jurors
were addressed as a group and again at the end when the parties exercised
peremptory challenges and when the defendant made the Batson challenge.
The other trial judge presided over a middle stage in which the attorneys
questioned prospective jurors individually. 70 During the Batson hearing,
68

See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In fact, federal law
has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a
prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory
reasons on the record.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1905 (2009) (habeas case); United States v.
Grant, 563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Smulls on direct review of a criminal
conviction), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2009); see also infra Part III.C. (discussing Smulls
and Grant).
69
561 F.3d 535, 540–41 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct.
1171 (2010).
70
Id. at 537.
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the prosecutor explained his decision to use peremptory challenges to
excuse two prospective jurors solely on the basis of their demeanor in
responding to questions during the middle stage of jury selection.71 The
judge who ruled on the defendant’s Batson challenge—who had not
observed the demeanor of those witnesses, as he did not preside over the
middle stage—nonetheless allowed the peremptory challenge. The Fifth
Circuit, on habeas review, held that the judge’s decision to deny the Batson
challenge, even though he had not observed the basis of the prosecutor’s
explanation, was error and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial or
to release from custody. 72
In ordering a new trial, the Fifth Circuit relied in part on the Supreme
Court’s guidance in Snyder regarding the critical role of the trial court in
resolving Batson objections, particularly those involving demeanor-based
explanations from the prosecutor.73 “For demeanor-based explanations
especially,” the court noted, “appellate review is necessarily dependent on
the trial court’s inquiry into the prosecutor’s reasons and his personal
observations of the juror’s demeanor that is the basis for those reasons.” 74
Because the trial judge who ruled on the defendant’s Batson challenge
assessed the plausibility of the prosecutor’s demeanor-based explanation on
the basis of the “cold record,” the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court erred
and therefore ordered that the defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus be granted. 75
The Supreme Court summarily reversed the Fifth Circuit, without
addressing the appropriate relief under such circumstances.76 The Court
clarified that, despite the importance of the trial court’s firsthand
observations during jury selection, neither Batson nor Snyder established a
per se rule that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the trial
judge did not observe or could not recall the juror’s demeanor. 77 While the
trial court’s firsthand observations of jurors can be important, the Court
noted that the ultimate inquiry concerns the intentions of the prosecutor,
and “the best evidence of the attorney exercising a strike is often that
attorney’s demeanor.” 78 The Court understood the Fifth Circuit to have
granted the writ of habeas corpus by applying a categorical rule that a
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 540–41.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1175.
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prosecutor’s demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory strike must be
rejected if the trial judge did not personally observe or could not recall the
juror’s demeanor. 79 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. 80 The
Court left open the question of “whether the [trial court’s] determination
may be overcome under the federal habeas statute’s standard for reviewing
a state court’s resolution of questions of fact.” 81
In McGahee v. Department of Corrections, 82 the Eleventh Circuit
ordered a new trial where the trial judge failed to make any of the findings
required by Batson and resolved the defendant’s Batson objection without
comment, saying only, “Your motion is denied.” 83 After trial, the trial court
asked the prosecution for more specific reasons for its use of peremptory
strikes, but again failed to make a specific ruling on the adequacy or
credibility of those reasons. 84 The failure to make any factual findings on
the defendant’s Batson objection, the Eleventh Circuit held, was an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, entitling the
defendant to a new trial. 85 As the Fifth Circuit did in Haynes, the Eleventh
Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Snyder. 86
State courts in Louisiana and Colorado have ordered new trials based
on similar reasoning. In State v. Jacobs, 87 the Louisiana Court of Appeal
ordered a new trial where the trial judge resolved the defendant’s Batson
objections without comment, saying only, “The Court is going to deny the
defense’s motion.” 88 Throughout its opinion, the court of appeal relied
upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder, holding that each instance in
which the trial judge denied the defendant’s Batson objection without
specifically addressing the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations
constituted reversible error.89

79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
560 F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2009).
83
Id. at 1259.
84
Id. at 1259–60.
85
Id. at 1259–61.
86
Id. at 1260, 1268, 1269.
87
13 So. 3d 677 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
88
Id. at 692.
89
See, e.g., id. (“Yet again, the trial judge failed to specifically address the plausibility of
any of the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanations, based on the prosecutor’s
credibility and the prospective juror’s demeanor. This failure constituted reversible error.”);
id. at 693 (“These strikes . . . illustrate the need for the trial judge to perform his pivotal role
in evaluating the claims as required by Snyder.”).
80
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In People v. Collins, 90 the Colorado Court of Appeals ordered a new
trial where the trial court focused more clearly on the defendant’s Batson
objection but ultimately overruled it without making any findings crediting
the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanations.91 The prosecutor gave
five race-neutral explanations for the peremptory strike at issue, two of
which concerned the juror’s demeanor. When the trial court initially
indicated an inclination to sustain the Batson objection, the prosecutor
stated that, as evidence of his lack of racial bias, he had no objection to the
other African-American prospective juror serving on the panel. 92 The trial
court ultimately overruled the Batson objection, discussing the individual
steps of the Batson procedure and ultimately concluding: “I’m going to
find, by preponderance of the evidence, that the decision to exclude [the
juror] was not motivated by racial—or because of her race. Again, I’m
considering the totality of the circumstances, which I think were not present
at the initial challenge.” 93
The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. The court noted
that the fact that the prosecutor struck one, rather than two, AfricanAmerican jurors was “relevant” but “not dispositive.” 94 Regarding the five
race-neutral reasons the prosecutor gave for the strike, the court held that
“three of the race-neutral reasons . . . are affirmatively refuted by the
record, and the district court did not specifically credit the others.”95 The
two reasons that the trial court did not specifically credit were based on the
prospective juror’s demeanor and could not be confirmed or rejected on the
basis of the record: the juror allegedly had her arms crossed and slept
during part of voir dire. 96 Citing and discussing Snyder, the court of
appeals refused to presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor’s
statements about the juror sleeping and crossing her arms where the trial
court did not specifically credit those explanations and where there was
some reason to believe that the trial court in fact did not credit those
statements. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that given its lack of
specific factual findings, the trial court “clearly erred in overruling the
defendant’s Batson objection.” 97 Unlike the cases in which trial courts have
overruled Batson objections without comment, in Collins there was greater
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

187 P.3d 1178 (Colo. App. 2008).
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1183–84.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
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reason to suspect that the trial court paid attention to the prosecutor and the
jury pool during jury selection and might have been able to recall the events
in sufficient detail to make reliable findings if the court of appeals ordered a
remand. Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that the trial court’s clear
error required reversal of the defendant’s convictions.98
Indeed, several other state and federal courts have ordered new trials
when confronted with a situation in which the trial judge has failed to make
the required findings and overruled a defendant’s Batson objection with
little or no comment. 99 Many of these decisions predate the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Snyder. 100 These courts have held that a new trial is a
natural extension of the Batson framework and is the appropriate remedy
where a trial court fails to make required findings.
B. COURTS REMANDING FOR FURTHER FINDINGS

In contrast, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (the last in an
unpublished opinion), 101 as well as several lower courts, have remanded to
the trial court to allow it to make retroactive factual findings or to hold
evidentiary hearings to reconstruct the prosecutor’s state of mind at the time
of jury selection. Where the trial court has failed to make the required
findings in the first instance, these courts in essence allow the trial court to
try again.
Many of these courts seem to read the relief ordered in Snyder as
resting solely on the fact that more than ten years had passed since jury
selection. They place great weight on the Supreme Court’s statement that
there was not “any realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation
[the motivation for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge] could be
profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade
98

Id.
See, e.g., Conway v. Dexter, No. 00-CV-7350, 2008 WL 4814260, at *13 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 31, 2008) (ordering a new trial on habeas review where “neither the trial court nor the
court of appeal made any serious effort to conduct the thorough inquiry required by
Batson”); State v. Cheatteam, 986 So. 2d 738, 753 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (relying on Snyder in
ordering a new trial where the prosecutor struck a juror because she was rolling her eyes, but
the trial court did not, through explicit findings, “verify the aspect of the juror’s demeanor
upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremptory challenge”); cf. People v. Gonzales,
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing for a new trial after Snyder where
“[t]he trial court . . . did not sufficiently question and evaluate the prosecutor’s exercise of
his peremptory challenges”).
100
Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1039 (Fla. 1991); Bernard v. State, 659 So. 2d
1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Jackson v Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Va. Ct.
App. 1989).
101
Love v. Scribner, 278 F. App’x 714 (9th Cir. 2008).
99
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after petitioner’s trial.” 102 Other courts have reached the same result
without directly addressing the appropriateness of that remedy. 103
United States v. McMath 104 is one of the clearer examples of how some
courts have read Snyder as having ordered a new trial instead of a remand
because of the passage of time. In McMath, the trial court resolved the
defendant’s Batson challenge without making any factual findings. During
jury selection, the Government used one of its peremptory challenges to
excuse one of the two African-American jurors on the panel. 105 Defense
counsel raised a Batson challenge, and the prosecutor responded that her
reason for striking the prospective juror was the “expression on his face”:
“He looked angry and not happy to be here.” Defense counsel disputed that
explanation, and the district court denied the Batson challenge without
making any findings, simply stating “[t]he Batson challenge is denied.” 106
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court “clearly erred in
denying the Batson challenge without making findings regarding the
credibility of the proffered race-neutral justification for the strike.” 107 As
the court put it, “the district court [1] did not indicate whether it agreed that
Juror 7 had an unhappy expression on his face, [2] did not indicate whether
this expression was unique to Juror 7 or common to other jurors, and [3]
made no evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.” 108 Accordingly, the
court could not “presume that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justification was
credible simply because the district judge ultimately denied the
challenge.” 109 Although the defendant argued that he was entitled to a new
trial under the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed and instead ordered a remand “for further findings and a possible
evidentiary hearing on the Batson issue.” 110 The Seventh Circuit explained
that it viewed Snyder as ordering a new trial instead of a remand because of
the passage of time:
102

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008).
See, e.g., Love, 278 F. App’x at 718 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing after
Snyder where the trial court prevented the defendant from “elicit[ing] the facts that would
have allowed the trial court [and appellate courts] to evaluate the alleged similarities”
between jurors who were struck and jurors who were not struck).
104
559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 373 (2009). The authors
represented Mr. McMath in his appeal and other proceedings following his initial trial and
sentencing.
105
Id. at 661.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 666.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
103
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In Snyder, remand for the trial judge to make findings regarding the juror’s demeanor
was deemed fruitless because the trial had occurred more than ten years prior. But
remand may be more worthwhile in this case, as voir dire occurred only a little over a
year ago. While it is certainly possible that the passage of time will make it
impossible for the district judge to make findings of fact, our concern for judicial
economy persuades us that allowing the district judge the opportunity for such
findings is the correct course. Upon remand, if the passage of time precludes the
district court from making factual findings, it must vacate the judgment of
111
conviction.

If, however, the district court found that it could make the required findings
on remand, the Seventh Circuit directed it to do so and then either move on
to sentencing or order a new trial.112
In Dolphy v. Mantello, 113 the Second Circuit ordered a remand under
similar circumstances. There, the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike
to remove an African-American prospective juror. When challenged, the
prosecutor stated that he struck the juror because she was overweight and
because, in the prosecutor’s experience, “heavy-set people tend to be very
sympathetic toward any defendant.”114 The trial court overruled the
defendant’s Batson objection, stating only that “I’m satisfied that is a race
neutral explanation . . . .” 115 On habeas review, the Second Circuit could
not “say that the trial court properly applied Batson.” 116 “Because the trial
court failed to assess the credibility of the prosecution’s explanation,” the
court held, “it follows that there was no adjudication of [the defendant’s]
Batson claim on the merits.” 117 The court therefore remanded to the district
court, stating that it “may, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the
prosecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection . . . or, if the passage
of time has made such a determination impossible or unsatisfactory, the
district court may grant the writ [of habeas corpus] contingent on the state
granting [the defendant] a new trial.” 118
Other lower federal and state courts have joined the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits in ordering remands instead of new trials. As noted,

111

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 670. In United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2007), appeal
after remand, 277 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit likewise
ordered a limited remand, directing the trial court to supply missing findings of fact. That
case is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.D, infra.
113
552 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2009).
114
Id. at 237.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 239.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 240.
112
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some of those opinions appear to order remands based on the belief that the
Supreme Court ordered a new trial in Snyder based solely on the fact that
more than ten years had passed since jury selection.119 Other decisions,
however, call for remand proceedings—or evidentiary hearings, in the case
of federal courts exercising habeas review—several years after jury
selection without any apparent consideration of the choice of remedy the
Supreme Court made in Snyder. 120
C. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S NARROW INTERPRETATION OF SNYDER

Further demonstrating the degree of doctrinal confusion in the lower
courts after Snyder is the fact that the Eighth Circuit does not read Snyder
as requiring explicit findings by the trial court at all. 121 The Eighth Circuit
apparently stands alone in this regard. In contrast to Snyder, where the
Supreme Court refused to presume that the trial court credited the
prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanation absent specific findings, the
majority in Smulls apparently took the opposite view, explaining that “[a]
trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is itself a factual determination,
and we have repeatedly upheld rulings made without additional
reasoning.” 122
The Smulls majority distinguished Snyder, noting that “a number of
factors” supported the Supreme Court’s refusal to presume that the trial
court credited the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reason for exercising a
peremptory challenge. 123 The majority focused on the fact that in Snyder
the prosecutor gave two reasons, one of which was belied by the record and
the other of which was demeanor-based. 124 In Smulls, by contrast, neither
of the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons was as suspect as the
119

See, e.g., Kassem v. State, 263 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (remanding for
the intermediate appellate court “to conduct a full Batson hearing and to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law or to make a determination that such a hearing would not be
practicable, in which case the [court] should remand for a new trial”).
120
See, e.g., Patterson v. Alameida, No. 02-CV-2321, 2008 WL 2326295, at *15 (E.D.
Cal. June 3, 2008) (ordering an evidentiary hearing eight years after jury selection); People
v. Davis, 899 N.E.2d 238, 249-50 (Ill. 2008) (ordering a remand four years after jury
selection); United States v. Taylor, 277 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2008).
121
See Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In fact, federal
law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where
a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory
reasons on the record.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1905 (2009) (habeas case); United States v.
Grant, 563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying Smulls on direct review of a criminal
conviction), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2009).
122
Smulls, 535 F.3d at 860.
123
Id. at 860–61.
124
Id.
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prosecutor’s reason in Snyder, and thus the court held, “the trial court’s
failure to make explicit findings [did not] relieve [the appellate] court of its
obligation to view the state trial court’s findings as presumptively
correct.” 125
Although there is some language in Smulls suggesting that its holding
was based on the AEDPA standard of review, 126 the Eighth Circuit
subsequently applied Smulls on direct review in United States v. Grant. 127
In Grant, the court of appeals examined a case in which the defendant
argued on appeal that the district court did not make detailed findings at
step three of the Batson procedure. In rejecting the defendant’s arguments,
the majority in Grant cited Smulls repeatedly for the proposition that trial
courts are not required to make findings of fact in the course of ruling on a
Batson challenge. 128 Both Smulls and Grant drew spirited dissents. 129

125

Id. at 861.
See id. (“In any event, Snyder was not clearly established law at the time of the state
courts’ rejection of Smulls’ Batson claim . . . .”). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may not
grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the state court’s adjudication was either “an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence” presented in state court or “contrary to, or . . . an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
127
563 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (2010).
128
See id. at 389 (“A trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge is itself a factual
determination. [F]ederal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson
challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the [non-moving party]
presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record.”) (quoting Smulls, 535 F.3d at
860 (original alterations)); id. at 390 n.3 (quoting the same language from Smulls); id. at 391
n.5 (“The district court’s analysis did not have to address, or make specific factfindings on,
all of Grant’s counsel’s reasons for striking Juror Ham.”); id. at 392 n.6 (“The district court
was not required to make specific factfindings, or provide explanation, on each reason
offered by Grant’s counsel.”).
129
Smulls, 535 F.3d at 868–74 (Bye, J., dissenting); Grant, 563 F.3d at 394–99 (Bye, J.,
dissenting). In Smulls, in particular, Judge Bye described the inconsistency between the
majority’s opinion and Snyder and rebutted the grounds on which the majority sought to
distinguish Snyder. Smulls, 535 F.3d at 870–73 (Bye, J., dissenting).
126
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Although the split predates Snyder, 130 most of the pre-Snyder cases
appear to hold that a trial court may order a limited remand most of the
time, as the Supreme Court did in Batson. Several cases have recognized,
however, that it is often unrealistic to expect anything useful to result from
those remands in light of the passage of time, the nature of the Batson
inquiry, and the fallibility of human memory. 131
By ordering a new trial instead of a remand, and by emphasizing the
importance of contemporaneous observations and factfinding by trial courts
during jury selection, Snyder has brought the remedy question into sharp
focus and further deepened the confusion among the lower courts. There is
now a mature split of authority that includes both the federal and state
courts and is in need of clarification.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY AFTER SNYDER
The practice of allowing remands for further findings on a defendant’s
Batson challenge has often proven to be unworkable and has caused
significant inefficiency in the lower courts. There are many practical and
theoretical problems associated with this practice, which at times has taken

130

Compare, e.g., Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1991) (reversing
conviction on the ground that “[p]eremptory challenges based on bare looks and gestures are
not acceptable reasons unless observed by the trial judge and confirmed by the judge on the
record”), Bernard v. State, 659 So. 2d 1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating, in
ordering a new trial, that “[p]eremptory challenges based on bare looks and gestures are not
acceptable reasons unless observed by the trial court and confirmed by the judge on the
record. In this case, the trial court did not confirm the facial expressions, and the record,
therefore, does not support the reason the state gave for its challenge.”) (citation omitted),
Davis v. State, 796 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (ordering a new trial where the
prosecutor “fail[ed] to explain why he considered [the juror’s] appearance and reaction
during voir dire to be adverse”), Jackson v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 5–6 (Va. Ct. App.
1989) (ordering new trial where “[t]he trial judge made no factual findings,” and observing
that under Batson “[t]he trial judge cannot merely accept at face value the reasons proffered
but must independently evaluate those reasons as he would any disputed fact” and thus “[t]he
record must contain findings by the trial judge, not just a conclusion, in order to facilitate
both the initial inquiry and appellate review”), and Hill v. State, 547 So. 2d 175, 176–77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (granting new trial where no evidence of juror yawning existed
other than prosecutor’s representation), with United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir.
2007) (remand for further findings), and People v. Johnson, 136 P.3d 804, 808 (Cal. 2006)
(same).
131
See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating
that it would be “unrealistic” “[i]n many—perhaps most—cases” to expect that the
prosecutor and trial will be able to recall the circumstances of jury selection in any useful
way and that “[w]hile we have every confidence in the good faith and professionalism of the
parties, we have less confidence in their memories”).
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on a life of its own, leading to successive appeals and additional
proceedings.
A. THE IMPOSSIBLE BURDEN ON TRIAL COURT JUDGES

At the third step of the Batson procedure, the trial judge must assess
the plausibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation “in light of all
evidence with a bearing on it.” 132 The Batson majority described this as a
“sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available.” 133 When an appellate court orders a remand for
retroactive findings on a Batson challenge, the trial judge may be asked to
recall—often years after jury selection—such things as a challenged juror’s
facial expression, whether a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for
challenging an African-American juror applied equally to non-challenged
white jurors, and the prosecutor’s demeanor at the time of the peremptory
challenge.
The Court recognized in Snyder that, where more than a decade had
passed between jury selection and the Court’s decision, there was no
“realistic possibility that this subtle question of causation could be
profitably explored further on remand at this late date.” 134 Given the typical
timing of the appellate review process and the sensitivity of the inquiry, the
Court’s observation in Snyder is also applicable to the run-of-the mill
appeal that moves more quickly. 135 More often than not, it is unreasonable
to expect trial judges to recall such subtle details months, if not years, after
the fact. Other courts have recognized this as well, at least in cases
involving delays of several years between the Batson challenge and the
remand. 136
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Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251 (2005) (emphasis added).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1985).
134
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008).
135
See also Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 370 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Years after trial, the
prosecutor cannot adequately reconstruct his reasons for striking a venireman. Nor can the
judge recall whether he believed a potential juror’s statement that any alleged biases would
not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror. Furthermore, any prosecutorial
misconduct is easily remedied before trial simply by seating the wrongfully struck
venireman. After trial, the only remedy is setting aside the conviction.” (footnote omitted)).
136
See, e.g., People v. Snow, 746 P.2d 452, 458 (Cal. 1987) (In a case involving a sixyear delay, court stated: “we believe it would be ‘unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor
could now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenges in
issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required, which would demand
that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the prosecutor
examined the venire and exercised his other challenges.’”) (quoting People v. Hall, 672 P.2d
854, 860 (Cal. 1983), a case involving a three-year delay).
133
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B. AN INVITATION FOR POST HOC JUSTIFICATIONS

In addition to the unreasonableness of asking trial courts to make
retroactive findings on Batson challenges, such requests invite post hoc
justifications on remand from prosecutors for making peremptory
challenges and from trial judges in allowing them. This is both a basic
aspect of human nature and a phenomenon that numerous courts have
recognized.137
As several Justices of the Supreme Court have acknowledged,
peremptory challenges are often the product of “seat-of-the pants instincts”
that defy articulation and that are based on reasons of which the prosecutor
may not be fully aware. 138 As Justice Breyer put it in a concurring opinion
in Miller-El v. Dretke, “at step three, Batson asks judges to engage in the
awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s
instinctive judgment—the underlying basis for which may be invisible even
to the prosecutor exercising the challenge.” 139 Justice Breyer also noted
that the psychological literature confirms the subconscious nature of the
sort of bias that the Batson procedure attempts to uncover. 140 Uncovering
such unconscious bias is difficult even under normal circumstances at the
time jury selection occurs.
However, if the task of second-guessing a prosecutor’s instinctive
judgment is “awkward” and sometimes “hopeless” just before trial, it is
even more so during a remand proceeding that typically occurs more than a
year later. As judges who were likely not paying sufficient attention during
the first proceeding try to remember their perceptions of jury selection from
more than a year earlier, and as prosecutors try to remember the reasons
they challenged a juror in the first proceeding, the results are unlikely to be
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See, e.g., Gray v. State, 562 A.2d 1278, 1284 (Md. 1989) (“[W]here there has been
the passage of considerable time between the event and the attempt at reconstruction, there
may be present an increased danger of perfectly innocent confabulation.”); United States v.
Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990).
138
Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139
545 U.S. 231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at
106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting the potential effects of unconscious racism and stating
that “[e]ven if all parties approach the Court’s mandate with the best of conscious intentions,
that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all levels—a
challenge I doubt all of them can meet”).
140
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 267–68 (citing literature); see also Bennett, supra note 15, at
151–58 (surveying literature on implicit bias); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton,
Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of
Peremptory Use Under the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261
(2007) (finding that a prospective juror’s race can influence peremptory challenge use and
that self-reported justifications are unlikely to be useful in identifying that influence).
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reliable. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a trial judge sustains a
prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge in the first instance, but decides
months or years later that the prosecutor was, in fact, not credible and that
the defendant should therefore get a new trial.
The Supreme Court noted the potential for unfairness under similar
circumstances in Miller-El v. Dretke, where it rejected a prosecutor’s afterthe-fact reason for exercising a peremptory challenge that the prosecutor did
not give during jury selection, stating that it “reek[ed] of afterthought,”141
and noting that “when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a
prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or
fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives.” 142
The same concerns apply with even greater force where the prosecutor
may be asked to explain the challenge months or years later and the trial
court is forced to make findings long after the fact. The potential for post
hoc rationalizations under such circumstances is great, particularly given
that both the prosecutor and the trial court have a significant incentive to
avoid a new trial. As the Second Circuit put it,
[p]ostponing consideration of a Batson claim until the trial is in progress, or even
completed, . . . risks infecting what would have been the prosecutor’s spontaneous
explanations with contrived rationalizations, and may create a subtle pressure for even
the most conscientious district judge to accept explanations of borderline plausibility
143
to avoid the only relief then available, a new trial.

C. THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS

In some instances, trial courts have conducted evidentiary hearings on
remand in an attempt to assist with the process of reconstructing memories
of jury selection, but such hearings tend to exacerbate the burden on judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys without much countervailing benefit.
Often they lead to new disputes, and in the absence of “smoking gun” type
evidence of racial bias by the prosecutor, such proceedings seldom
illuminate the original reasons for the prosecutor’s exercise of the
peremptory challenge.
Batson explicitly declined to set forth any procedural requirements
beyond the general three-step inquiry in which a trial court assesses the
credibility of a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory

141
142
143

Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246.
Id. at 252.
United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990).
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challenge. 144 Where a court of appeals orders a limited remand under
Batson, the issue of the peremptory challenge is in sharp focus, and months
or years have typically passed. The defense and the prosecution predictably
dispute what procedures should be followed on remand, such as whether the
prosecutor who exercised the challenge should be required to testify under
oath and subjected to cross-examination, whether the prosecutor will be
permitted to offer additional reasons on remand beyond those given at jury
selection, and whether the parties will be allowed to take discovery and
submit new evidence. 145
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements in Miller-El v.
Dretke, 146 some courts have allowed prosecutors to supplement their raceneutral explanations on remand. In United States v. Taylor, for example,
the Seventh Circuit ordered remands to the district court twice to supply
missing Batson findings. In the first remand, the trial court failed to supply
the missing findings. Accordingly, in conjunction with ordering the second
remand, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the trial court conduct an
evidentiary hearing. On remand, the district court did so, and permitted the
Government “to state reasons beyond [the] record for challenging or not
challenging jurors in question.” 147
Moreover, the danger of post hoc rationalization on remand is perhaps
even greater when there is an evidentiary hearing than when the trial court
simply tries to make retroactive findings without taking additional
evidence. Under such circumstances, the court is essentially inviting the
prosecution to come up with new evidence that was not presented during
the original trial, and potentially new theories, justifying the prior exercise

144
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (“We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to
be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.”). See
generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural
Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187 (1989), for a discussion of the
questions raised by the Court’s decision in Batson to decline to establish specific procedures
for conducting the inquiry into a prosecutor’s motives.
145
A recent petition for certiorari asked the Supreme Court to address such questions and
to require that the defendant be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor under
oath and have access to the prosecutor’s notes in connection with a Batson remand. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Drake v. Louisiana, No. 09-998 (Feb. 18, 2010), available at
2010 WL 638483. The Court denied the petition. 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010).
146
See supra Part IV.B.
147
Minute Order, United States v. Taylor, No. 01-CR-73 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2008)
(Docket Entry No. 1032). The case is now pending before the Seventh Circuit in a third
appeal, docketed as appeal No. 09-1291.
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of a peremptory challenge.148 And of course, the court is also inviting the
defense to find and present further evidence that the prosecutor is prone to
racial bias. In sum, conducting an evidentiary hearing on remand is as
likely to lead to new disputes as it is to supply the basis for missing
findings.
D. ENDLESS APPEALS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS

As is apparent from the forgoing discussion, Batson remand
proceedings often involve the expenditure of significant judicial resources.
At the same time, given the sensitive and subtle nature of the Batson
inquiry, the passage of time, the fallibility of human memory, and the
subconscious nature of racial bias, such proceedings often fail to produce
conclusions worthy of confidence. Thus, it is questionable whether on
balance they further Batson’s purpose of “produc[ing] actual answers to
suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury
selection process.” 149
In addition to being unreliable, such remand proceedings can often
take on lives of their own and expend more judicial resources than a new
trial. 150 One example of this phenomenon is the ongoing litigation in
United States v. Taylor. In Taylor, the indictment issued in 2001, and jury
selection and the jury’s guilty verdict occurred in 2004. The case is now, in
2010, on its third appeal to the Seventh Circuit relating to the same Batson
issues.
In 2004, during jury selection, the district court failed to make findings
at the third step of the Batson procedure. 151 In 2007, on the first appeal, the
Seventh Circuit ordered a remand “for the limited purpose of
supplementing the record with [the district court’s] findings about whether
the government’s stated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge
against [the stricken juror] is credible, or whether the defendants met their
burden of demonstrating discrimination.” 152 On remand, the district judge
148

Cf. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Crossexamination of the prosecutor on remand showed that, after the remand, the prosecutor spent
“six to eight hours” reviewing the transcript of jury selection and “that is when he came up
with his explanations” for the challenged strikes. Id.
149
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005).
150
This risk is particularly acute in cases involving relatively minor crimes with
relatively uncomplicated facts. For example, in United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th
Cir. 2009), the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm that had
traveled in interstate commerce. The initial trial and jury selection lasted one day, and a new
trial would likely have consumed the same amount of time.
151
United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2007).
152
Id. at 845–46.
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reviewed transcripts and issued a short statement to the effect that he
remembered jury selection (which had occurred nearly four years earlier)
and concluded, based on his recollection of the prosecutor’s demeanor and
arguments, that the prosecutor was credible. 153
On a second appeal, in 2008, the Seventh Circuit found the district
court’s findings still lacking and remanded again, ordering an evidentiary
hearing so that the district court could “determine de novo whether the
Batson challenge has merit.” 154 On the second remand, the parties engaged
in a lengthy dispute regarding the appropriate procedures. The district court
allowed the prosecution to give new race-neutral explanations for its
peremptory challenges, but it did not allow the defendants to cross-examine
the prosecutors under oath or to have access to the prosecutors’
contemporaneous notes of jury selection. After the evidentiary hearing,
which was held more than four years after jury selection, the district court
issued a twenty-one page opinion sustaining the peremptory challenge.155
The case is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit for a third time, and among the
defendants’ arguments are challenges to the procedures used during the
evidentiary hearing. 156 Had the Seventh Circuit simply ordered a new trial
instead of a remand, it seems likely that fewer resources would have been
expended.
As long as the law remains unclear regarding the consequences of a
trial court’s failure to make findings at the third step of the Batson
procedure, such remands directed to reconstructing a procedure Justice
Breyer described as “awkward” and “hopeless” will continue to tie up
judicial resources, with little or no countervailing benefit.
E. EX ANTE INCENTIVES FOR DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND
PROSECUTORS

Finally, a bright-line rule requiring a new trial in every case in which a
trial court fails to make sufficient Batson findings to permit appellate
review would provide an ex ante incentive to trial judges and prosecutors to
be more conscientious and would give effect to the principle underlying
Batson. From an ex post perspective, when a trial court has not made the
required findings, the appellate court is presented with a choice between
153
Statement, United States v. Taylor, No. 01-CR-73 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2008) (Docket
Entry No. 1026).
154
United States v. Taylor, 277 F. App’x 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2008).
155
United States v. Taylor, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.D. Ind. 2009).
156
Defendants-Appellants’ Joint Brief, United States v. Taylor, No. 09-1291 (7th Cir.
filed June 16, 2009). The Court heard oral argument on April 27, 2010, and the case remains
pending. Oral Argument, United States v. Taylor, No. 09-1291 (7th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010).
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ordering a new trial and ordering a remand to see if the result of the initial
trial can be salvaged, and the latter choice has an understandable appeal.
But from an ex ante perspective, if trial judges know that insufficient
Batson findings will lead to reversal on appeal and an automatic new trial,
they will have an incentive to be more conscientious in discharging the task
that Batson requires. Similarly, prosecutors will have a clearer incentive to
ensure that an appropriate contemporaneous record is made whenever a
defendant raises a Batson challenge during jury selection. A bright-line
rule would thus provide a strong incentive to avoid the precise conduct that
Batson was designed to remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court should
clarify its holding in Snyder and should—we suggest—adopt a clear rule
that a new trial is required where the trial court fails to make the findings
necessary to support the denial of a defendant’s Batson challenge and where
the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation cannot be confirmed or rejected
on the basis of the record.
Such a rule will give trial courts a strong incentive to fulfill their
“pivotal role” of supervising jury selection closely in the first instance.
While the remedy of a new trial might be criticized as wasting the results of
what may have been completely fair trials, it is fully consistent with Batson
and in many instances it is the only practical way to give effect to the
principle Batson announced, without discarding peremptory challenges. In
Batson, the Court rejected the reasoning of Swain and held that even though
peremptory challenges are traditionally immune from judicial scrutiny, trial
courts should nonetheless be able to examine a prosecutor’s reasons for
exercising a peremptory challenge whenever there is a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.
Moreover, the Court recognized in Batson that what the trial court was
looking for would often be a subtle, subconscious bias on the part of the
prosecutor rather than overt racism. Where a trial court fails to discharge
that responsibility in the first instance in a way that permits appellate
review, it is often neither feasible nor efficient to ask the trial court to do so
retroactively. A bright-line rule requiring a new trial is the most effective
and efficient means of enforcing the Batson rule, and would bring needed
clarity to the Supreme Court’s precedents.
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